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1. Introduction 
Studies of a number of industry sectors (Christensen, 1997) have shown that radical 
innovations are significantly more likely to originate with firms that are outsiders 
rather than industry incumbents, especially if the innovations involve competence 
destroying rather than competence enhancing technological discontinuities. However 
research into this phenomenon has tended to focus on the failings of incumbents 
rather than the strengths of outsiders. 
This study attempts a reassessment by focusing on the role of outsiders. It presents a 
case study drawn from the world of Formula 1 motor racing described by Jenkins and 
Floyd (2001: 949) as the, ‘pinnacle of automotive technology’. The focus of the study 
is a single radical innovation, the introduction of the moulded carbon fibre chassis 
during the 1980s. It aims to analyse the attributes of outsiders that make them well 
placed, or certainly better placed than their counterparts in incumbent firms, to 
capitalise on the introduction of path-breaking new technologies. The particular 
attribute that forms the focus of the study is the social or relational capital of the 
designers and engineers responsible for the development of Formula 1 racing cars and 
the circumstances under which this can help them to access external knowledge and 
expertise that can provide the basis of a new or emerging technological regime. 
The study offers the prospect not only of enhancing our understanding of why 
outsiders are often the ones responsible for bringing about technological 
discontinuities, it also sheds light on the value of relational capital in connection with 
innovation and new product development. In the process it highlights the nature of 
the problems created by technological discontinuities. 
The paper is structured in seven sections. Following this introduction, section two 
outlines the literature on technological discontinuities and social capital, while the 
third section outlines the methodology employed. Section four reviews earlier 
technological discontinuities in Formula 1. Section five presents the case study which 
examines a single radical innovation and the part played by outsiders in bringing it 
about. Section six analyses the part played by social capital in the innovation process, 
while the final section outlines the contribution of this case study to our knowledge of 
competence destroying technological discontinuities. 
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2. Literature Review 
Much technological change is actually incremental, involving relatively modest 
advances that build on existing practice (Nelson and Winter, 1982). As such it is 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. However the process of continuous evolution 
is punctuated from time to time by discontinuous change (Romanelli and Tushman, 
1994) in the form of major technological advances and breakthroughs. These 
advances and breakthroughs form ‘technological discontinuities’ (Foster, 1986: 35), 
that represent a step change as one technology is replaced by another. The result is 
typically the emergence of entirely new products or substitutes for existing products. 
Technological discontinuities disrupt (Christensen, 1997) and set in train a new 
direction for what Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995: 234) term the ‘performance 
trajectory’. As an existing technology reaches the limits of its S-curve (i.e. the 
relationship between performance and engineering effort), so a switch to a new S-
curve with a new performance trajectory (Foster, 1986) starts to take place (see figure 
1). According to Foster (1986) it is this gap between S-curves that constitutes a 
technological discontinuity. So significant is the technological change associated 
with the advances and breakthroughs involved that, as Tushman and Anderson (1986: 
44) note, ‘no increase in scale, efficiency or design can make older technologies 
competitive with the new technology’. The result is a dramatic improvement in cost, 
performance or quality over existing products (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). 
However such breakthroughs occur relatively rarely and are watershed events. Often 
such is the impact of technological discontinuities on the competitive landscape that 
they have disruptive effects on the structure of the industry (Ehrnberg, 1995; Mensch, 
1979). 
*********** 
Insert Figure 1 
*********** 
Technological discontinuities are not homogeneous. Tushman and Anderson (1986) 
distinguish between those technological discontinuities that are ‘competence 
destroying’ and those that are ‘competence enhancing’. Competence destroying 
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technological discontinuities involve the introduction of technologies that are so 
fundamentally different from existing ones that they draw on a different technology 
base, demanding new techniques and know-how and the development of qualitatively 
new technological capabilities within the innovating firm (Christensen, 1997; 
Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994). Thus much of the accumulated expertise 
associated with a technology that has been built up over many years rapidly becomes 
obsolete. Competence enhancing discontinuities on the other hand involve 
technologies which, while they may lead to significant improvements in performance, 
tend to build on existing know-how and an established knowledge base rather than 
overturning it. Competence enhancing technological discontinuities may therefore be 
seen as taking place within what Van De Poel (2000: 384) terms an existing 
‘technological regime’, that is to say existing techniques, know-how and capabilities. 
While competence-enhancing technological discontinuities tend to originate with 
incumbent (i.e. existing) firms, a body of research (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) points 
to competence-destroying technological discontinuities being attributable to outsiders 
rather than incumbents. In industries as diverse as disk drives (Christensen, 1997), 
mechanical excavators (Christensen, 1997), personal computers (Campbell-Kelly, 
2004), jet engines (Constant, 1980), VCRs (Rosenbloom and Cusumano, 1987) and 
digital imaging (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), the lead in developing radical innovations 
was taken by outsiders, that is new entrants who were not established players in the 
industry. A study by Tushman and Anderson (1986) found that seven out of 11 
competence destroying discontinuities they studied originated from new firms and in 
a similar study by Utterback (1994) the proportion was 26 out of 31. In contrast both 
studies found that competence enhancing discontinuities were dominated by 
incumbent firms. 
Outsiders are defined by Van de Poel (2000) as being individuals or firms outside an 
existing system of interaction (i.e. network) within which technological development 
takes place. As such they typically do not share the guiding principles about the 
design and development of the technology concerned. The guiding principles 
represent an existing technological regime associated with a particular product and the 
technology that lies at its heart. Very often these guiding principles are implicit and 
followed by actors on the basis of habit or tacit knowledge. No matter how they are 
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formed, outsiders will tend to be people or organisations that in some way, perhaps by 
virtue of their prior experience, do not entirely share the guiding principles associated 
with a particular technology. 
A variety of explanations have been offered to explain why it is that competence 
destroying technological discontinuities tend to be pioneered by outsiders. In general 
these explanations have focused on incumbent firms and the difficulties they 
encounter when faced with a new and radically different technology. Among the most 
widely cited explanations for incumbents failure to innovate are organisational inertia 
that may constrain the actions of incumbents, economic incentives that lead 
incumbents to favour incremental rather than radical innovation, and the tendency for 
incumbents to focus on meeting the needs of existing customers rather than exploring 
new applications (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). The factors identified as leading 
outsiders to pioneer radical innovations tend to be the converse of those that constrain 
incumbents. Hence the absence of internal inertia and the freedom to focus on new 
market niches without worrying about existing customers, are cited as advantages that 
outsiders possess (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003), as is the incentive to invest in 
unproven technologies as a means of getting round barriers to entry. One of the few 
studies to take a different line is that by Van de Poel (2000: 389) who suggests that 
outsiders benefit from not knowing the rules or conventions of an established 
technological regime, and are thus not likely to be constrained by them. Linked to this 
factor is the possibility that because they are not part of an existing technological 
regime outsiders may possess social or relational capital, frequently cited as an 
important factor in innovation (Conway, 1997), that is more diverse than that of 
incumbents. 
Social, or relational capital, is defined by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) as the 
potential resources that are available through the network of relationships that an 
individual possesses. These resources comprise both people and knowledge/ 
information. Hence social capital comprises two key dimensions (Schiuma, et al., 
2008), a structural element – knowing the right people (Burt, 2005) and a content 
element – knowing people with the right knowledge/ information (Adler and Kwon, 
2002). The structural element of social capital derives from the way individuals can 
benefit from having more diverse contacts by virtue of the range of different networks 
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(i.e. groups) with which they are associated. Individuals whose contacts span a 
number of different groups or networks will tend to possess greater social capital in 
terms of the breadth of knowledge to which they potentially have access, compared to 
those whose networks are confined to just one or a small number of groups. Burt 
(2005) suggests that having contacts that span several different networks or groups 
provides scope for what he terms ‘brokerage’, that is facilitating the transfer of 
knowledge between groups. The significance of this for innovation is illustrated by 
the example that Burt (2005: 73) cites of Eugene Stoner, who was able to combine 
contacts from his experience as an ordnance technician in the US Marines with 
contacts from his time at the aerospace contractor Fairchild, in the development of a 
revolutionary new ultra-light assault rifle, the M-16. 
There is considerable debate about the nature of the linkages associated with social 
capital, in particular over the relative benefits of strong and ‘weak ties’. The latter 
comprise informal links that are not well established, with infrequent contact and little 
or no emotional commitment. Though one might intuitively expect such links to be of 
limited value because of their informal nature, in fact Granovetter (1973) has shown 
that the diversity associated with weak ties can be an invaluable source of knowledge. 
Similarly Hayton (2005:149) notes that the greater the diversity of an individual’s 
experience, the more diverse the sources of social capital, which can provide ‘access 
to a broader range of social and professional networks from which new ideas can be 
acquired’. Studies of the biotechnology industry (Rickne, 2006; Shan et al., 1994; 
Powell et al., 1996) have shown how in science-based businesses in particular, the 
quality of social capital in the form of well developed networks, is often linked to 
firms’ performance in terms of innovation. 
Thus those placed outside or at least on the periphery of an industry or sector, may 
actually be well placed in terms of social capital when it comes to innovation. With 
more diverse experience, more diverse links/contacts, albeit weak ones, when 
competence destroying discontinuities occur they may be better placed than those 
within a well established technological regime, because their social capital may 
provide the means of accessing external knowledge and expertise that may provide 
the basis of a new or emerging technological regime. 
6 
P
stp
int
3. Methodology 
The study presented here is based on a single case, a research approach that has been 
used extensively in the analysis of decision making processes (Allison, 1971; 
Vaughan, 1996). The unit of analysis is a radical innovation that formed a competence 
destroying technological discontinuity, something that is comparatively rare even in a 
technology-led sector like Formula 1. The innovation in question was one of a small 
number of radical innovations to have transformed Formula 1 in the last 60 years. As 
such it represented a major technological discontinuity which had far reaching 
consequences. 
The case study was derived from documentary sources, located in the public domain. 
This did not prove problematic since as Lazonick and Prencipe (2005: 502) note, ‘in 
the age of the internet one can go quite far in doing company level research…by 
relying on publicly available information’. Furthermore the sporting nature of the 
sector means that, as earlier researchers (Henry and Pinch, 2000; Jenkins and Floyd, 
2001; Jenkins, 2010) have noted, large quantities of high quality data are available. 
A range of documentary sources were used. As others (Henry and Pinch, 2000) have 
noted specialist periodicals in this field offer a wealth of material that can provide a 
valuable ‘behind the scenes’ perspective on Formula 1. Consequently the first and 
most extensively used source was the searchable digital archive of the specialist 
periodical, Motor Sport, covering a 40 year period from 1960 – 1999. This archive 
includes detailed reports on every Formula 1 race over this period, as well as articles 
on particular constructors, technical analysis and in-depth interviews of key 
individuals such as designers, team principals and technical staff. Using this, data 
about the development of Formula 1 chassis technology was extracted. This was 
supplemented by further data, much of it technical in nature, gathered from specialist 
technical publications such as Racecar Engineering, Professional Engineering and 
Engineering Failure Analysis, which had in turn been identified from online databases 
including Business Source Complete and ScienceDirect. In addition a number of other 
specialist periodicals such as F1 Racing and Classic Cars, as well as specialist 
websites such as F1complete.com, were also consulted. 
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The data gathered in this way was supplemented by corroborative material gathered 
from specialist texts documenting various aspects of Formula 1. These fell into one of 
two broad categories, those that were essentially of a technical nature examining 
aspects of Formula 1 technology (Henry, 1988; Wright, 2001) and historical studies. 
The latter comprised biographies of designers (Crombac, 1996; Ludvigsen, 2010), 
corporate histories of Formula 1 teams/constructors and suppliers (Nye, 1984: Robson, 
1999) and studies of the motor sport industry in the UK (Aston and Williams, 1996; 
Beck-Burridge and Walton, 2000). In general the data gathered from these sources 
was used to cross-reference that gathered earlier, although it also provided a 
substantial amount of contextual detail, which helped to place the development of 
carbon fibre applications in a broader context. 
Having amassed a substantial body of data in this way it was then subjected to 
content analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2007) using a simple manual coding system based 
on critical incidents, key actors, and inter-personal links in relation to the 
development of chassis technology. From this a timeline tracing the historical path 
around the focal event – the introduction of the first moulded carbon fibre chassis in 
Formula 1 was produced which in turn formed the basis of the narrative for the 
detailed in-depth case study. 
Documentary sources like other forms of data have their limitations. Two key issues 
in terms of the quality of evidence provided by such sources are, as Scott (1990: 6) 
notes, authenticity, and credibility. Authenticity is a matter of ensuring that the 
evidence is genuine and actually is what it purports to be, while credibility is a matter 
of ensuring that the events described are believable and can be taken at face value. 
The use of a number of different types of document ensures the quality of the 
evidence used. The various types of document used were written by specialist 
technical authors and journalists, many of whom have previously worked in the sport 
often in a technical role. As a result they know and have worked with many of the 
individuals and teams they write about. This close contact and engagement helps to 
ensure they provide an authentic (i.e. genuine) account of events. Similarly because 
the audience for these documents is made up largely of followers of the sport, with 
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scrutiny, credibility is not an issue either. 
A particular benefit of the multiplicity of different documentary sources used is that it 
allows the events described to be placed in the longer term context of the development 
of Formula 1 chassis technology, and in the process provides insights into the long 
term dynamics of the technological discontinuities themselves. 
4. Technological discontinuities in Formula 1 chassis technology 
The chassis represents a key part of a racing car, since it is the central load bearing 
structure (Gilchrist and Curley, 1999). Until the 1940s virtually all racing cars 
employed a twin beam structure (see table 1) comprising two longitudinal steel beams 
or tubes linked by cross members (Tipler, 2001). This was the same design used by 
road cars at the time and by trucks even today. Though strong, this type of structure 
was heavy and prone to flexing when cornering at speed. Although this detracted from 
the car’s handling, pre-war racing was primarily about engine power (Jenkins, 2010) . 
*********** 
Insert Table 1 
*********** 
The late 1940s saw the first technological discontinuity in chassis design with the first 
series produced racing car, the Italian Cisitalia D46 designed by Giovanni Savonuzzi 
(Ludvigsen, 2010), utilizing a tubular steel spaceframe chassis. This radical 
innovation dispensed with the two longitudinal members in favour of a multi-tubular 
welded structure comprising small diameter steel tubes. The spaceframe retained the 
requirement for a separate body, but it was light, strong and cheap and easy to 
construct and rapidly became the norm in Formula 1 during the 1950s. 
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the tubular steel spaceframe reigned supreme 
(Tipler, 2002). But a shift to less powerful engines in 1961, forced designers to place 
greater emphasis on chassis technology (Jenkins, 2010). Innovation came not from 
established teams like Ferrari but a relative newcomer, Lotus. Developed in great 
secrecy (Crombac, 1996), on the 18th May 1962 (Tipler, 2002: 28) the team’s young 
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designer Colin Chapman unveiled the Lotus 25, a car with an entirely new kind of 
chassis, employing a riveted monocoque structure (Jenkinson, 1962), in which the 
aluminium skin itself was made to carry the structural load. Chassis and body formed 
a single integrated structure as on an aircraft (Constant, 1980). Not only was the Lotus 
25 chassis radically different in structural terms from the tubular steel spaceframes 
then in use, utilizing a different material, aluminium sheet, and fabricated using 
aircraft style riveting (Ludvigsen, 2010), it provided greater rigidity for less weight 
(Jenkinson, 1962). 
It soon became apparent that Chapman had ‘stolen a march on his rivals’ (Tipler, 
2002: 28). The riveted monocoque structure was not only lighter than a conventional 
tubular steel spaceframe, it also possessed exceptional torsional rigidity (Tipler, 2002), 
which in turn made the tyres work more efficiently thereby significantly improving 
the car’s handling. In its first season the Lotus 25 suffered with minor technical 
problems, but the following year Jim Clark won seven out of ten Formula 1 world 
championship races, giving Lotus its first constructor’s title (see table 2). Such was 
the car’s dominance that over four seasons from 1962 to 1965 Lotus won 19 of the 39 
world championship races (Crombac, 1996: 119). Where Chapman led the Formula 1 
community quickly followed (Aird, 2010). 
*********** 
Insert Table 2 
*********** 
The introduction of powerful turbocharged engines in the 1970s formed the precursor 
to a third technological discontinuity. Teams reliant on the conventionally aspirated 
Cosworth DFV V8 engine found themselves under pressure (Henry, 1988), leading 
them to look to technical ingenuity in chassis design to remain competitive. Thus was 
born the era of ‘ground effects’, where designers used the shape of the underside of 
the car to create downforce that would improve a car’s cornering ability. In the 
process designers made the chassis ever narrower, but this weakened the car’s 
torsional rigidity and thus its handling. To overcome this, designers were forced to 
consider new materials and one of the materials they looked to was carbon fibre. As 
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with previous technological discontinuities, the development of the carbon fibre 
moulded chassis was a radical innovation pioneered by an outsider. 
5. The case of the McLaren MP4/1 
4.1 The introduction of carbon fibre into Formula 1 
Among the first applications of carbon fibre was in 1968, when Rolls-Royce 
announced that its RB-211 engine being developed for the Lockheed L1011 Tristar 
airliner would use lightweight carbon fibre fan blades. Unfortunately the carbon fibre 
fan blades proved unable to meet the required simulated ‘bird strike’ tests and 
eventually had to be abandoned (Spinardi, 2002: 385) in favour of conventional 
titanium fan blades. However despite this setback during the 1970s carbon fibre 
gradually became more widely available. Roger Sloman, who had set up the 
Advanced Composites Group (ACG) at Derby in 1972, became a strong advocate of 
the potential of carbon fibre for motor sport applications and during the course of the 
decade several teams experimented with carbon fibre, but always as a reinforcement 
rather than a structural element of a racing car chassis. 
Radical innovation finally appeared on the 6th March 1981 (Nye, 1984: 221), when 
the world’s first racing car with a complete carbon fibre chassis was unveiled to the 
press at a rain soaked Silverstone circuit in Northamptonshire. That car was the 
Marlboro McLaren MP4/1 and it had taken almost two years to develop. This 
revolutionary car was the product of the new McLaren International Formula 1 team 
formed in September 1980 from a merger of Ron Dennis’s Project 4 Racing Formula 
2 team and the McLaren Formula 1 team (Cooper, 1999). No longer was carbon fibre 
used to support and reinforce an aluminium monocoque structure, this time the 
structure was entirely moulded carbon fibre. 
The carbon fibre McLaren MP4/1 was followed within a week by the unveiling of 
another carbon fibre Formula 1 car, the new Lotus 88 (Ludvigsen, 2010: 189) 
designed by Colin Chapman. However although the chassis was of carbon fibre it 
relied on fabrication techniques that borrowed heavily from existing methods used for 
aluminium monocoque structures. While the McLaren MP4/1’s moulded carbon fibre 
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structure rapidly became the dominant design for Formula 1 chassis and McLaren in 
turn became the most successful constructor of the 1980s and 1990s (see table 3), 
Lotus’s rather less ambitious construction methods proved to be a ‘technological cul-
de-sac’ (Savage, 2010: 106), and the team never again won the constructors’ title 
finally exiting the sport in 1994. 
*********** 
Insert Table 3 
*********** 
4.2 John Barnard 
The architect of this technological discontinuity was McLaren’s young chief designer, 
John Barnard. Born in 1946, Barnard gained an engineering diploma from Watford 
College of Technology and then worked as an industrial designer for the UK based 
electrical company, GEC, where he designed machines for making light bulbs. 
In 1968 at the age of 22, Barnard joined Lola Cars as a junior designer (see table 4), 
working alongside Patrick Head, who would go on to design Formula 1 cars for the 
Williams team (Taylor, 2012). Lola, founded by Eric Broadley in 1958 was not a 
Formula 1 team, instead it was a racing car constructor building cars for a variety of 
types of racing. One of the fields in which Lola was prominent at the time was sports 
and GT cars, and among Broadley’s designs were the Le Mans winning Ford GT40, 
designed in partnership with the Ford Motor Company, and the Lola T70 (Scorah, 
2010: 62). By the late 1960s when Barnard joined Lola, Broadley was heavily into 
racing in the US (Scorah, 2010), Lola designs having won both the Indianapolis 500 
and the new CanAm sports car series in 1966. The latter was one of the most 
innovative forms of racing at the time, and among the developments it produced were 
the first cars with wings and the first engines to utilize turbocharging. 
*********** 
Insert Table 4 
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In 1972 Barnard broke into Formula 1 when he moved to McLaren and for the next 
three years worked with chief designer Gordon Coppuck on the design of the Formula 
1 World Championship-winning McLaren M23. However Barnard’s efforts were not 
confined to Formula 1. While at McLaren he continued his involvement with racing in 
the United States, though this time with open wheel racing in the form of Indycars. He 
was closely involved in the design of McLaren’s M16 car, which with its pioneering 
wedge shape and side radiators derived from the Lotus 72 Formula 1 car, proved very 
stable at high speed on oval tracks in the US, winning the Indianapolis 500 in 1972, 
1974 and 1976. 
Barnard’s success in Indycars led to him being hired in 1975 as a designer for the 
California based Vels Parnelli Jones Racing Team (Kirby, 2010). The Barnard 
designed VPJ6B, was a trail-blazing design that instead of being powered by the 
venerable Meyer & Drake Offenhauser engine which had dominated open wheel 
racing in the United States since the 1930s (Robson, 1999), used the new Cosworth 
DFX engine (Kirby, 2010), a re-engineered version of the British Cosworth DFV 
engine (Robson, 2007) that dominated Formula 1 at the time. De-stroked to 2.65 litres 
and turbocharged, the Cosworth DFX proved highly successful, rapidly rendering the 
Offenhauser engines obsolete. In the hands of Al Unser and Danny Ongais, the 
VPJ6B dominated Indycar racing between1976 and 1978 (Kirby, 2010). 
Barnard thus rapidly built himself a reputation in Indycar design, leading to an 
approach in 1978 from Jim Hall to join his Chaparral team based in Midland, Texas. 
Hall had been a dominant force in US sports car racing during the 1960s as a driver, 
designer and team owner. His Chaparral cars had even enjoyed considerable success 
in endurance racing in Europe. Returning to racing in 1978, Hall switched from sports 
cars to Indycars and recruited Barnard to design a new car for him. This was to be yet 
another in a long line of innovative Chaparral cars. The Barnard designed Chaparral 
2K, like its predecessors heralded the introduction of new technology, being the first 
car to introduce ‘ground effects’ to Indycar racing (Couldwell, 2003: p140) and the 
success of the Chaparral 2K marked Barnard out as a ‘revolutionary designer’ 
(Fearnley, 2011: 65). 
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4.3 The MP4/1 carbon fibre chassis 
The success of the Chaparral 2K in the US drew Barnard to the attention of Ron 
Dennis of the Project 4 Racing team which ran March chassis in Formula 2 and 3. 
Though his Project 4 Racing Team was enjoying considerable success in Formula 2, 
Dennis was keen to compete in Formula 1 as his next step. Thus during the latter part 
of 1979 Dennis approached Barnard about a potential Formula 1 project. Barnard for 
his part had what Henry (1988: 23) describes as, ‘his own pet theories about 
manufacturing an all carbon fibre composite chassis’. So it was that Barnard returned 
to the European racing scene at the start of 1980 (Cooper, 1999). 
In order to optimise ground effects, Barnard reasoned that his design needed to 
employ the narrowest possible chassis cross section. As he explained, ‘I wanted to get 
the bottom of my chassis down to not much bigger than the driver’s bum’ (Cooper, 
1999: 306). However a narrower chassis meant a potentially less rigid chassis because 
a narrow section aluminium monocoque would be inclined to flex. Retaining torsional 
stiffness presented the designer with little option but to use a material other than 
aluminium. Thin gauge steel was the logical choice but it implied a weight penalty. 
Barnard however was keen to try carbon fibre. Barnard was attracted to carbon fibre, 
which at that time was used almost exclusively in aerospace applications (Savage, 
2007), postulating that it could offer a huge step forward both in chassis stiffness and 
weight reduction. While several Formula 1 designers, as noted earlier had used carbon 
fibre in their designs, no one had ever used it other than as a reinforcement for another 
material. There were many within Formula 1 who were sceptical of the scope for 
using carbon fibre for structural applications in a racing car. In the late 1970s the 
material had a poor reputation in terms of its ability to withstand impact, the result of 
highly publicised problems with aero engine applications at Rolls-Royce, and the in-
service failure of early race components (Savage, 2010). Barnard’s detractors initially 
at least dismissed the idea of using such a brittle material in race car construction. 
Hence building a chassis comprised entirely of carbon fibre was at the time a very 
bold step. As Cooper (1999: 307) suggests perhaps only a person like John Barnard 
with limited experience of Formula 1 ‘was cocky enough to take such a gamble’. 
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Convinced that it was possible to produce a chassis from carbon fibre, Barnard was 
faced with the problem of how to get it built, since the team clearly had no 
manufacturing capability where carbon fibre composite was concerned. What made 
the situation more difficult was that Barnard didn’t just want to build a chassis from 
carbon fibre, he wanted to create a complete moulded monocoque, but in order to do 
so, a dramatic shift in the current approach to manufacturing composite materials was 
required (Jenkins, 2010). Other designers in Formula 1 had experimented with carbon 
fibre, using flat carbon panels for instance in place of flat aluminium panels (Fearnley, 
2011). But this amounted to no more than using carbon fibre to reinforce an existing 
aluminium monocoque structure. Barnard’s approach was radically different. He 
planned to make the entire chassis from carbon fibre and to produce it as a single 
moulding. This was an entirely different design principle compared to earlier attempts 
at using the material. The potential advantage of moulding was that it would provide 
a more complete composite structure that would be stronger and therefore could be of 
lighter construction. To achieve this Barnard proposed to construct the new chassis 
using layers of pre-impregnated carbon fibre moulded around a large cast and 
machined aluminium mandrel. The structure would then be cured under pressure in a 
large autoclave (Wright, 2001). Finally the mandrel would be dismantled and 
removed via the cockpit aperture. At the time it was unusual to fabricate a relatively 
large structure from carbon fibre composite in this way. Lacking this capability and 
the resources to acquire it, sub-contracting chassis manufacture was the only option. 
Despite leading-edge work being undertaken in the UK aerospace industry, there was 
no interest in this kind of project from established UK companies. According to 
Barnard, ‘Over here they either said it was too much for them, or that we were, in fact, 
mad’ (Cooper, 1999: 307). Thus fabrication of the new moulded carbon fibre 
composite chassis presented a major obstacle. Barnard had to look further afield 
(Jenkins, 2010) and help came from one of his contacts from his earlier involvement 
in Indycar racing in America (see table 4), Steve Nichols, who pointed Barnard 
towards Hercules Aerospace in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Hercules was a chemical company that moved into carbon fibre when it took out a 
licence for a carbon fibre manufacturing process from the British company Courtaulds 
in 1969 (Dyer and Sicilia, 1990). The Hercules Aerospace division participated in 
several missile programmes during the 1970s including Trident, MX and Pershing II, 
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providing lightweight carbon composite casings which housed the missile’s propellant. 
By the later 1970s it had moved into aircraft components and structures that used 
significant amounts of carbon fibre. Major applications for Hercules Aerospace 
included the F-18 fighter where 10 per cent of the airframe was carbon fibre and the 
AV8B vertical takeoff aircraft where 28 per cent of the airframe was made of carbon 
fibre (Dyer and Sicilia, 1990: 412). In 1978 Hercules severed its relationship with 
Courtaulds and instead entered a joint venture with the Japanese firm Sumitomo. 
Having acquired the ability to make the raw material for carbon fibre production, 
Hercules was by 1980 the world’s only fully integrated carbon fibre producer. As an 
integrated producer Hercules Aerospace was able to develop a capability to fabricate 
specialist low volume aerospace structures, and it had an R & D section set up to 
carry out one-off odd jobs. One high profile example was the experimental Voyager 
aircraft made almost entirely of carbon fibre, in which pilots Dick Rhutan and Jeanna 
Yeager made the first flight around the world without stopping or refuelling. 
As a leading aerospace carbon fibre composite manufacturer, Hercules Aerospace 
had access to the most advanced manufacturing techniques available for producing 
large moulded structures (Wright, 2001), so Barnard was soon on a plane to the US 
complete with a one third size wind tunnel model and the drawings for the new 
chassis (Cooper, 1999). Hercules agreed to take the job, effectively becoming a sub-
contractor for monocoque construction. The one piece moulded design proved so 
successful that it remained virtually unchanged for six racing seasons (Gilchrist and 
Curley, 1999). 
The fact that McLaren had developed the first moulded monocoque gave it a major 
technological advantage. Barnard’s design had double the torsional stiffness and a 
substantially increased ground effects area, while at the same time being lighter 
(Fearnley, 2011). This contributed to its winning the 1984 and 1985 World 
Championships (see table 3). Despite the reservations of many of their competitors, 
the McLaren MP4/1 design proved so successful that it was copied in one form or 
another by every other Formula One team (Savage, 2010). In fact Barnard’s concept, 
which many had doubted in the early days, in time became the industry standard. 
6. Analysis: The role of Social Capital 
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The Project 4 team that John Barnard joined in 1980 was effectively an outsider as 
far as the close-knit Formula 1 community was concerned, the team being described 
by one commentator as, ‘a fledgling team whose budget was far from secure’ (Cooper, 
1999: 309). If the team was an outsider, so too was its team owner Ron Dennis and its 
chief designer John Barnard. Although he had been a mechanic with the Cooper and 
Brabham teams in the late 1960s, for almost a decade Dennis had been out of 
Formula 1 running cars in Formula 2 and 3, first with Rondel racing and latterly with 
his own Project 4 team (Collings, 2002). Similarly Barnard’s career had effectively 
involved just one stint in Formula 1. Almost from the start the main focus of 
Barnard’s work had been the racing scene in the US (see figure 2). Even when 
working for British teams and constructors like Lola and McLaren, Barnard’s focus 
had largely been on US-based race series like CanAm and Indycars, and latterly he 
had been working for American teams based in the US. Consequently his reputation 
as a designer up to this point, was very much based on successful Indycar projects. 
Another factor that made the Project 4 team an outsider was its youth. Both Dennis 
and Barnard were in their early 30s. This, plus the fact that it was a newcomer, placed 
Project 4 very much on the periphery of the ‘small world’ (Henry and Pinch, 2000: 
200) of Formula 1. A world in which as Cooper, (1997: 60) notes ‘every one knows 
every one and most have worked with each other too’. Dennis and Barnard in contrast, 
were unusual in that much of their prior experience had been in other forms of racing. 
*********** 
Insert Figure 2 
*********** 
As an outsider, the structure of Barnard’s social capital was uncharacteristic of 
Formula 1 designers of the period. In structural terms his network of personal contacts 
was more diverse than was normally the case. Not only that, it also extended to 
groups well beyond the normal confines of the Formula 1 community, to cover other 
categories of racing particularly in the US. These categories of racing represented 
different groups or networks of racing personnel located geographically and 
technologically at a distance from Formula 1. 
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Figure 2 shows that Barnard’s personal network included a number of the leading 
designers and team owners of the period. From Formula 1 there were designers like 
Gordon Coppuck of McLaren and March and Maurice Philippe of Lotus and Tyrell, 
as well as Patrick Head of Williams, with whom Barnard had worked at Lola. 
However it included a much more eclectic mix of people than just those from Formula 
1. There was Eric Broadley of Lola, one of the most influential racing car designers of 
the period, responsible for a wide range of cars spanning almost all categories of 
racing in Europe and the US. Significantly Broadley’s company Lola Cars was not a 
racing team but a constructor producing cars for sale to a wide range of customer 
teams. Unlike other leading designers of the period, like Colin Chapman of Lotus and 
Tony Rudd of BRM, Broadley had strong connections with the US racing scene. 
From his years working in the US, Barnard’s network also included a number of 
leading figures from the American racing scene. Jim Hall of Chaparral was not only a 
team owner and former driver, but one of the most innovative racing car designers of 
the 1960s, with significant innovations to his credit including glass fibre chassis 
construction and the semi-automatic gearbox. He was also the first designer to make 
serious use of aerodynamics. Hall’s Chaparral 2F ‘wing’ car of the 1960s was 
instrumental in bringing aerodynamics to Formula 1 (Buijs, 1988). Also included in 
Barnard’s network was Parnelli Jones a leading Indycar driver and owner of one of 
the most successful teams of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Nor was Barnard’s network of contacts confined to leading designers and team 
owners, for having worked in the US for several years he was able to draw on a 
wealth of contacts at all levels of the sport. Hence it would be fair to say that in 
structural terms Barnard’s network was much more diverse than that of his 
contemporaries in Formula 1 (see figure 2). It extended to all three of the principal 
branches of motor sport, namely Formula 1, Indycars and sports/GT cars. Hence in 
Burt’s (2005: 17) terminology Barnard’s social capital provided a ‘bridge’ between 
different groups or networks. This potentially provided Barnard with a greater breadth 
of knowledge than most of his fellow designers. It placed him in a position where in 
structural terms he could engage in ‘brokerage’ (Burt, 2005:73), that is moving 
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knowledge familiar in one group to a second group unaware of it, such as between the 
Indycar racing community in the US and the Formula 1 community in Europe. 
Barnard’s social capital was not merely structural in terms of a wide and eclectic mix 
of people. In terms of content his diverse range of contacts represented valuable 
sources of knowledge not just in relation to Formula 1 technology but other classes of 
racing and other technologies as well. His time at Lola had provided Barnard with a 
breadth of knowledge about all aspects of racing that he himself acknowledged saying 
of his time at Lola, ‘those years were irreplaceable for the experience and knowledge 
I gained in all aspects of racing car design and operation’ (Couldwell, 2003: 139). It 
was significant that Barnard joined Broadley’s company at a time when it was 
becoming much more involved in racing in the US. When Barnard moved to the US 
in the mid-1970s he brought about some of the most significant innovations in 
Indycar racing. His VPJ6 car brought about a major change in Indycar racing being 
the first to use a British Cosworth DFX engine instead of the ubiquitous home-
produced Offenhauser unit that had been used sine the 1930s, thereby starting a trend 
that all other teams quickly followed. Similarly Barnard’s Chaparral 2K was not only 
highly successful, it was also the first Indycar design to make effective use of ‘ground 
effects’, an achievement that led to Barnard being awarded the prestigious Louis 
Schnitzer design award in 1979. 
All of the individuals identified so far were leading designers or team owners with 
whom Barnard had worked and from whom he had acquired specialised knowledge. 
However there were many other individuals from diverse backgrounds with whom 
Barnard was acquainted through his work. These individuals represented what 
Granovetter (1973) terms ‘weak ties’, being more informal and casual acquaintances. 
They included people like Patrick Head whom Barnard had worked with as a junior 
designer at Lola. It was through Head that Barnard heard that Ron Dennis was 
looking for a designer for his Project 4 team and that he was planning to move up to 
Formula 1 (Cooper, 1999). In addition Head was by this time a leading designer 
himself, recognised as the most successful proponent of ‘ground effects’ through his 
Williams FW07 design, a car described by Peter Wright of Lotus as, ‘ the definitive 
ground effects car’ (Wright, 2001: 307). 
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Two other individuals with whom Barnard had ‘weak ties’, proved particularly 
important in enabling him to access knowledge and expertise about carbon fibre. The 
first was a contact that Barnard had at British Aerospace. British Aerospace were 
using carbon fibre to manufacture nacelles that housed Rolls-Royce jet engines 
(Cooper, 1999), and it was through visiting the company’s Weybridge site that 
Barnard learnt about the properties of carbon fibre. The second individual was Steve 
Nichols, the shock absorber engineer whom Barnard knew from his Indycar days 
(Cooper, 1999: 307). Nichols was from Utah (Hilton, 1989: 209) and had spent the 
first four years of his career after graduating from university, working for Hercules 
Aerospace in Salt Lake City. Given Hercules’ expertise in carbon fibre noted earlier, 
Nichols not only had a high level of knowledge and expertise about the properties of 
carbon fibre, he was also knowledgeable about manufacturing techniques and well 
aware of Hercules Aerospace’s capabilities, particularly when it came to producing 
large moulded structures in carbon fibre (Cooper, 1999). Hence Nichols proved a vital 
link both in enabling Barnard to acquire knowledge of carbon fibre, and, given the 
difficulties the team encountered in finding a company to produce a large carbon fibre 
moulding in the UK, in locating a company willing and able to fabricate Barnard’s 
new chassis design. 
Thus ‘weak ties’ within his network of colleagues, former colleagues and 
acquaintances, proved absolutely vital in enabling Barnard to bridge the gap between 
existing chassis technology and the requirements of carbon fibre construction. 
Significantly the other team to make the leap to a carbon fibre chassis at this time 
was Lotus who were very much an insider within Formula 1. They used a quite 
different construction technique that relied on ‘cut and fold’ methods borrowed 
directly from the existing aluminium chassis technology. This approach, which 
retained the construction methods used by the existing technological regime though 
with new materials, proved less satisfactory and ultimately proved to be a 
‘technological cul-de-sac’ (Savage, 2010: 106), since as Lotus’s Peter Wright later 
acknowledged 20 years later in a major study of Formula 1 technology, ‘the 
techniques used by McLaren showed the future’ (Wright, 2001: 317). 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
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Technological discontinuities loom large in the innovation literature (Christensen, 
1997; Foster, 1986) and considerable attention has focused on technological 
discontinuities that are competence destroying. However much of the research effort 
has gone into analysing why incumbents fail to pioneer discontinuities, rather than 
why outsiders succeed. It is no coincidence that the subtitle of Christensen’s (1997) 
definitive study of competence destroying technological discontinuities is entitled, 
‘When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail’. The literature tends to portray 
the success of outsiders in pioneering radical innovations in terms of the failings of 
incumbent firms, rather than a function of the attributes and actions of outsiders. This 
study attempts a re-appraisal. It does so by looking not at the negative features of 
incumbents but rather at the positive features of outsiders. It focuses on the attributes 
of outsiders, in particular their social capital and how this can be used to provide them 
with what Foster (1986) terms ‘the attacker’s advantage’ in the management of 
innovation and the development of new technology.. 
The study focuses on a major technological discontinuity in the high technology 
world of Formula 1, namely the introduction of carbon fibre composite and the 
development of the world’s first racing car to employ a moulded carbon fibre chassis. 
In this instance, while several established and successful teams in Formula 1 had 
made limited use of this new material, the leap to using carbon fibre involving 
completely different construction techniques that bore no resemblance to the methods 
employed in the industry at the time, was pioneered by an outsider, a team new to 
Formula 1 (certainly in terms of personnel if not name). 
In making this leap the case study clearly shows how social capital was a decisive 
factor. Social capital provided the means to make the required technological leap. The 
contrast between McLaren and Lotus, is stark. Lotus, an incumbent team, which until 
this point had been highly successful, also pioneered the use of carbon fibre in chassis 
construction but relied on knowledge and construction methods that borrowed heavily 
from existing technology, leading to what ultimately proved a technological cul-de-
sac. Barnard at McLaren on the other hand, through the use of his more diverse social 
capital was able to bridge the gap between existing practice in the Formula 1 
community and specialist aerospace applications where carbon fibre mouldings were 
being used. What was particularly important was the capacity that social capital 
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provided for ‘bridging’ between these two knowledge communities, thereby allowing 
Barnard to benefit from weak ties. 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of social capital in sectors such as 
science based industries where access to knowledge is critical. This study suggests 
that social capital is in fact more widely applicable. Its particular contribution is in 
relation to research into competence destroying technological discontinuities, where it 
provides a badly needed change of focus, away from incumbents and their failings, 
and towards outsiders and the factors that make them well placed to pioneer radical 
innovations. The study points to outsiders’ social capital being a particularly valuable 
asset by virtue of its structural characteristics and the diverse contacts it embraces. 
It would clearly be inappropriate to generalize from a single case and one could argue 
that the highly competitive, technology laden world of Formula 1 is unusual and 
untypical of industry practice in other less glamorous sectors. However these potential 
limitations are more than offset by the in-depth nature of the case study which 
provides a valuable insight into why and how outsiders are often well placed when it 
comes to the application and implementation of new technologies, something that has 
infrequently been demonstrated in the past . 
This clearly has important implications for future research and points to the need for 
further in-depth studies in other sectors focused not just on the role of outsiders but in 
particular on the nature of their social capital and how they use it. Similarly it also has 
implications for managerial practice surrounding the management of technology, 
highlighting as it does the potential value of social capital based on diversity of 
experience, in circumstances where managers find themselves faced with 
technological discontinuities and need to find ways of bridging old and new 
technological regimes. 
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Table 1 
Technological discontinuities in Formula One chassis design 
Manufacturer/ 
Designer 
traditional 
Cisitalia 
(Savonuzzi) 
Lotus 
(Chapman) 
McLaren 
(Barnard) 
Technological 
Discontinuity 
n/a 
Competence 
enhancing 
Competence 
enhancing 
Competence 
destroying 
Table 2 
Formula One Constructors Championship 1961-1980 
Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Winning 
Constructor 
Ferrari 
BRM 
Lotus 
Ferrari 
Lotus 
Brabham 
Brabham 
Lotus 
Matra 
Lotus 
Tyrell 
Lotus 
Lotus 
McLaren 
Ferrari 
Ferrari 
Ferrari 
Lotus 
Ferrari 
Williams 
Lotus 
Position 
2nd 
2nd 
1st 
3rd 
1st 
5th 
2nd 
1st 
3rd 
1st 
5th 
1st 
1st 
4th 
7th 
4th 
2nd 
1st 
4th 
5th 
Lotus 
points 
32 
37 
58 
40 
56 
21 
50 
62 
47 
59 
21 
62 
92 
42 
9 
29 
62 
86 
39 
14 
Source: Ludvigsen (2010) 
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Date 
1900s-1940s 
1950s-1960s 
1960s-1980s 
1980s-
present 
Chassis type 
Twin beam 
Tubular space 
frame 
Stressed skin 
monocoque 
Moulded 
monocoque 
Material 
Steel 
Steel 
Aluminium 
Carbon 
fibre 
Construction 
Bolted 
Welded 
Riveted 
Autoclave 
(baked) 
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Table 3 
Formula One Constructors Championship 1981-90 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Winning 
Constructor 
Williams 
Ferrari 
Ferrari 
McLaren 
McLaren 
Williams 
Williams 
McLaren 
McLaren 
McLaren 
McLaren 
Position 
6th 
2nd 
5th 
1st 
1st 
2nd 
2nd 
1st 
1st 
1st 
McLaren 
points 
28 
69 
34 
143.4 
90 
96 
76 
199 
141 
121 
Source: F1complete (2011) 
Table 4 
John Barnard’s design career 1968-86 
Team/ Team Principal Date Race Series Car 
Constructor 
Lola Cars 
McLaren 
Parnelli 
Chaparral 
Project 
4/McLaren Int. 
Eric Broadley 
Teddy Mayer 
Parnelli Jones 
Jim Hall 
Ron Dennis 
1968-72 
1972-75 
1975-78 
1978-79 
1980-86 
Can-Am 
Formula 5000 
Formula 1 
Formula 5000 
Indycar 
Indycar 
Indycar 
Formula 2 
Formula 1 
T260 
T330 
M23 
M25 
M16 
VPJ6B 
2K 
Superseded 
MP4/1 
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Figure 1 
S-curves and Technological Discontinuities 
Figure 2 
John Barnard’s Personal Network (1980) 
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